( 2 ) worse non - linear cost function is existed , so the location error is big ( 2 )算法中存在嚴(yán)重的非線性代價(jià)函數(shù),定位精度不高。
In chapter 3 , we chiefly study on the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination under two manufacturers , generally the studies on the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination in former papers were based on monopoly market , that is there is only one monopoly manufacturer in market . this paper expand the content of its research to the market conditions of two factories , based on a complete static information model and the linear demand functions and linear cost functions , the paper study the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination under two manufacturers , which compete in the same markets . it further respectively put forward the calculation formulas of the maximum sales volume and the maximum price and the maximum profit which belong to both manufacturers who is on the condition of common price or third - degree price discrimination in the two sub - markets , and also it put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for third - degree price discrimination to be effective or to be same as common price 本文第三章主要研究了兩廠商情形下的三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問題,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)對于三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問題的研究基本上都是基于壟斷廠商情形,即市場上只有一個壟斷廠商的情形,而本文將其研究的內(nèi)容拓展到了兩廠商情形,基于完全信息靜態(tài)模型研究了競爭市場上的兩廠商在線性需求函數(shù)和線性成本函數(shù)條件下的三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問題,并分別給出了兩廠商在兩個子市場上,在單一價(jià)格條件下以及歧視價(jià)格條件下的最優(yōu)銷售量、最優(yōu)價(jià)格和最大利潤的計(jì)算公式,給出了各廠商價(jià)格歧視有效和價(jià)格歧視無異于單一價(jià)格的充要條件。