residual claims造句
例句與造句
- it is a proper combination of contractual claim, contractual control, residual claim and residual control, which try to satisfy the participation constraint and efficient principle . efficient property right structure results from market trade and will evolve into a more efficient one
企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)就是通過契約索取權(quán)、契約控制權(quán)、剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)這四者的不同組合，來滿足企業(yè)參與者的參與約束和制度得以生存的效率原則。 - the key innovation in this article is : firstly, from difference between the makers and takers of audit risk, we can get to know the different use of human capital and financial capital of accountant firms . then, we can define the arrangement of residual claim and residual rights of control
論文的主要創(chuàng)新在于：(1)從審計風(fēng)險的直接制造者和最終承擔(dān)者來區(qū)分事務(wù)所人力資本和非人力資本的作用，初步確定了事務(wù)所剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)的分享安排。 - however at present it is normal that human capital especially entrepreneurial human capital was looked down on and underestimated in china . the property right of entrepreneurial human capital was not accepted by the enterprise . entrepreneurial human capital's residual claim was deprived
然而目前我國普遍存在對人力資本尤其是企業(yè)家人力資本的輕視與低估，企業(yè)家人力資本在分享企業(yè)收益時其產(chǎn)權(quán)沒有得到承認(rèn)，其“剩余索取權(quán)”被剝奪，企業(yè)家的激勵不足。 - eso plays an important role in executive managers " s incentives since it appeared in the middle of 20th century . the idea behind stock options is to align incentives between the managers and shareholders of a company . it matches the power of “ surplus control ” with the power of “ residual claim ” by letting the executive mangers participate in the distribution of residual claim, consequently enabling manager's benefit goal to be most consistent with the enterprise shareholders " wealth
國外的研究現(xiàn)狀呈現(xiàn)出以下特點(diǎn):一是對公司治理及經(jīng)理人激勵理論的研究較為完善,但對引入股票期權(quán)后的激勵問題研究較少;二是研究多集中在對股票期權(quán)激勵效果的實證分析,但對其內(nèi)在的激勵機(jī)理分析不夠,即使在實證研究方面,也存在著較大的分歧;國外的反對者則認(rèn)為,期權(quán)在企業(yè)中遭到濫用,期權(quán)歪曲了企業(yè)收益的概念,這部分 - eso plays an important role in executive managers " s incentives since it appeared in the middle of 20th century . the idea behind stock options is to align incentives between the managers and shareholders of a company . it matches the power of “ surplus control ” with the power of “ residual claim ” by letting the executive mangers participate in the distribution of residual claim, consequently enabling manager's benefit goal to be most consistent with the enterprise shareholders " wealth
國外的研究現(xiàn)狀呈現(xiàn)出以下特點(diǎn):一是對公司治理及經(jīng)理人激勵理論的研究較為完善,但對引入股票期權(quán)后的激勵問題研究較少;二是研究多集中在對股票期權(quán)激勵效果的實證分析,但對其內(nèi)在的激勵機(jī)理分析不夠,即使在實證研究方面,也存在著較大的分歧;國外的反對者則認(rèn)為,期權(quán)在企業(yè)中遭到濫用,期權(quán)歪曲了企業(yè)收益的概念,這部分 - It's difficult to find residual claims in a sentence. 用residual claims造句挺難的
- management buy-outs ( mbo ) emerged in the eighties last century . it can reduce agency's cost and lower down the restraint to manager's power effectively through the realization of the takeovers of decision-making rights of control, residual rights of control and residual claim right by the way of manager's purchase of the company
管理者收購(mbo)興起于上世紀(jì)八十年代，它通過管理層購買公司的大部分股份或資產(chǎn)，實現(xiàn)管理層對決策控制權(quán)、剩余控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)的接管，從而降低代理成本。 - then the author puts forward the most important opinion of this article-that is, ( 1 ) in the theory of incomplete contract contributed by ghm, residual rights of control are too abstract, which just like a " black box ", to lose quite a number of the ability of explanation in theory . ( 2 ) hhe article replaces the residual claim with control right as the central conception to analyze corporate governance issue
在此之后，作者提出了本文的核心觀點(diǎn)：在以ghm為代表的不完全契約理論方法中，剩余控制權(quán)太抽象了，就像一個“黑匣子”，使其失去了相當(dāng)多的理論解釋力；用控制權(quán)取代剩余控制權(quán)作為分析公司治理問題的中心概念。 - afterwards taking the classical firm as the starting point, the article analyzes in detail the separation between residual claim and real control right and the agency problems which are caused by the separatioa the article especially analyzes the change of the configuration of real control right under the circumstance of introducing the outer investors, and also analyzes the benefit conflicts surrounding the real control right between shareholders and managers, shareholders and creditors, majority shareholder s and minority shareholders
然后，本文以古典企業(yè)作為起點(diǎn)，詳細(xì)分析了剩余索取權(quán)與實際控制權(quán)的分離及其導(dǎo)致的代理問題，特別是，分析了在引入外部投資者的情況下，實際控制權(quán)的配置變化，以及股東與經(jīng)理之間、股東與債權(quán)人之間、大股東與小股東之間的圍繞實際控制權(quán)的利益沖突。 - the issues of residual claim and residual rights of control, the risk taking and return distribution become more and more significant as the discussion of property right is going on and the bodies of property right is clearer, and all of the issues are much concerned with the arrangement of corporate governance . 2 . the corporate governance is of importance when the principal-agent model prevails in the medium and large scale of companies and the firm as a contract is incomplete
從理論層面上看，隨著對產(chǎn)權(quán)問題討論的不斷深入，產(chǎn)權(quán)主體的相對明確，剩余索取權(quán)和控制權(quán)安排、風(fēng)險承擔(dān)及收益分配等問題變得越來越重要，而這些問題無一不與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)安排密切相關(guān)；委托代理及企業(yè)合約設(shè)計問題在企業(yè)理論中的地位越來越重要，因而也越來越受到學(xué)術(shù)界的重視，當(dāng)委托代理關(guān)系在大中型企業(yè)十分流行且企業(yè)合約設(shè)計存在缺口時，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)就變得更為重要了。 - with regard to the development of venture capital in china, capital, project and human resources are all confinements to some degree . however, the main problem is low governance efficiency of vc derived from the vague agency relationship in vc fund . the appropriate allocation of residual claim rights and control rights is key approach
就轉(zhuǎn)軌期中國的風(fēng)險投資業(yè)而言，資金、項目、人才等都在一定程度上制約了風(fēng)險投資的發(fā)展，但機(jī)制重于資金、機(jī)制重于技術(shù)，最根本的問題，是源于風(fēng)險投資公司內(nèi)部委托代理關(guān)系不清晰而衍生出來的風(fēng)險投資公司和創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的公司治理效率低下。 - with the analysis of this model, this paper point out that the distribution of ownership and the control right are according with what we learned form the modern enterprise theory in which the residual claim right be required to match with the residual control right in nature, but there is difference between them in the form to the venture enterprise coming from the character of venture investment
通過對模型及其擴(kuò)展形式的分析得出，在風(fēng)險企業(yè)中的控制權(quán)與所有權(quán)的分配在本質(zhì)上與現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論中所強(qiáng)調(diào)的“剩余控制權(quán)與剩余索取權(quán)相匹配”是一致的，但是因為風(fēng)險投資的特點(diǎn)而在形式上有所不同。 - under this basis the article points that the separation between residual claim and control right, which has been observed by berle and means, should be understood the separation of residual claim and real control right the problem brought out by the separation is the right issue that needs to be resolved by the corporate governance
在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文指出伯利和米恩斯觀察到的剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離，應(yīng)該理解為剩余索取權(quán)與實際控制權(quán)的分離，而由它們的分離所帶來的問題正是公司治理需要解決的問題。 - under this basis the article points that the separation between residual claim and control right, which has been observed by berle and means, should be understood the separation of residual claim and real control right the problem brought out by the separation is the right issue that needs to be resolved by the corporate governance
在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文指出伯利和米恩斯觀察到的剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離，應(yīng)該理解為剩余索取權(quán)與實際控制權(quán)的分離，而由它們的分離所帶來的問題正是公司治理需要解決的問題。 - this paper describes and considers explanations of improvement in corporate governance and transfer of state-owned shares in the chinese stock market . corporate governance in china serves to resolve the problem of asymmetric information in managing firms . it is a property rights contract to match the residual claims and residual rights of control
公司治理，是伴隨著現(xiàn)代公司所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)相分離而產(chǎn)生的一整套契約制度，它通過合理配置剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán)，形成科學(xué)的激勵機(jī)制和相互權(quán)力制衡機(jī)制，從而協(xié)調(diào)利益相關(guān)者--股東、債權(quán)人、經(jīng)營者和職工之間的責(zé)權(quán)利關(guān)系，旨在達(dá)到降低代理成本和提高公司運(yùn)營效率的目的。 - the paper then goes on to propose some feasible means of establishing an incentive binding system of the manager of township enterprises as follows : 1 ) withdraw township collective assets from township enterprises in form of currency and transfer them to the manager and workers so as to make the manager own residual claim and control power over enterprises and thus to solve the problem of motivating business manager in a deeper sense; 2 ) settle the issue of choosing business manager, namely, establish an effective mechanism which may ensure that those most capable of management will take the place of manager
在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文提出，建立鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)經(jīng)營者激勵約束機(jī)制的實現(xiàn)途徑是：一、通過鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)集體資產(chǎn)以貨幣形態(tài)從鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)退出，將集體資產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)讓給企業(yè)經(jīng)營者和企業(yè)職工，讓企業(yè)經(jīng)營者擁有剩余索取權(quán)和企業(yè)控制權(quán)，從而在深層次上解決企業(yè)經(jīng)營者激勵問題。二、解決企業(yè)經(jīng)營者選擇問題，即建立能保證將最有經(jīng)營才能的人占據(jù)經(jīng)營者位置的有效機(jī)制。