The mainstream of modern theory of firm has some important limits on the research of corporate governance because it is lack of thorough discussion on the internal structure of shareholders ( or proprietors ) 現(xiàn)代主流企業(yè)理論未能對股東(或所有者)的內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)進行深入研究,從而對公司治理的研究存在著很大的局限性。
On the base of the time ' s changes and the newest achievements on the theory of firm , author proposes a new mode of cost management on the general speaking for the deficits of the two traditional mode of cost management 本文基于時代變化發(fā)展的特征和企業(yè)理論發(fā)展的最新成果,針對作業(yè)成本管理和成本企劃的缺陷提出作者的思考與建議,擬在一般意義上提出一種新的成本管理模式。
The focus of the theory of firm growth mechanism is on how firms achieve growth . there are mainly three modes and mechanisms of firm growth , namely organic growth , acquired growth and network based growth . and these three mechanisms are matched with the strategic thoughts of firm resource based schools , environment schools , resources dependence schools , and clusters schools respectively 企業(yè)成長機制理論主要探討企業(yè)通過什么方式實現(xiàn)成長,目前主要存在著內(nèi)部成長、并購成長和網(wǎng)絡(luò)化成長三種基本的企業(yè)成長方式和機制,它們分別對應(yīng)于企業(yè)資源基礎(chǔ)理論、環(huán)境學(xué)派、資源依賴學(xué)派和集群理論的戰(zhàn)略思想。
In the face of this puzzle , we insist on the basis of theory of firm methodologically . then we study the economic cause of formation of strategic alliance . theories of firm we use in the process of logical inference include theory of division of labor , theory of exchange , modern theory of contract and theory of property 面對這種困境,我們堅持在方法上以企業(yè)理論為基礎(chǔ),進而研究企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟的形成動因,在邏輯推理過程中所使用到的企業(yè)理論有分工理論與交換理論、現(xiàn)代契約理論和產(chǎn)權(quán)理論。
On the micro - angle , we study two aspects . on one side , we reexamine the main current game theory from individual view , unearth its disadvantages , and put forward a mechanism of coordination that will lead to the balance of cooperation . on the other side , we revise the theory of firm from organization view , analyze and compare the efficiency of all kinds of firms 本文以全方位、多層次的視角來探究協(xié)調(diào)問題:在微觀方面,我們首先從微觀個體的角度反思了主流的博弈理論,并探究達成合作博弈的協(xié)調(diào)機理;其次,從微觀組織的角度對企業(yè)的協(xié)調(diào)進行了分析,重新審視了企業(yè)的性質(zhì)及其規(guī)模擴展的狀況,并從協(xié)調(diào)的角度比較了各類企業(yè)的效率。
The study are including : [ 1 ] analyse of chongqing soe " economy condition and framework of human resource . lower benefit of soe was caused without effective incentive system . [ 2 ] the paper puts forword a systematic theoretic pattern of the employee stock ownership plan , by adopting prior reseearch findings of modern theory of firms , human capital theory , etc , [ 3 ] analyse the examples of case 故對員工持股的應(yīng)用制定操作步驟,提供操作規(guī)范;通過對重慶天友乳品有限公司員工持股的案例分析,為員工持股在國有企業(yè)改革中應(yīng)用提供可以借鑒的范例,并討論了應(yīng)用中存在的問題,提出解決的思路。
On the basis of analyzing and summarizing the conventional theories , the transactions costs economics and penrose theory , this dissertation draws the competence theory of the firm ( cohen and levinthal , 1990 , 1994 ) and the behavior theory of firm adaptation ( march , 1991 ; levinthal and march , 1993 ) into an analytical system for diversification , and constructs a learning - based research framework grounded by the exploitation and exploration of knowledge resource 本研究在分析和總結(jié)傳統(tǒng)多角化理論基礎(chǔ)? ?交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)和penrose理論的基礎(chǔ)上,將企業(yè)能力理論( cohenandlevinthal , 1990 , 1994 )與企業(yè)行為適應(yīng)理論( march , 1991 ; levinthalandmarch , 1993 )引入多角化分析框架,并以企業(yè)知識資源的充分利用與開發(fā)為主線建立起了一個基于學(xué)習(xí)視角的研究架構(gòu)。
They are the contractal theory of the firm , the principal - agent theory of the firm , the managerial theory of the firm , the entrepreneurial theory of the firm and the entrepreneurial - contractal theory of firm etc . . they are the theoretical basis for the discussion on the enterprise institution in russiachapter two and chapter three is a studying about the arrangement and change with the enterprise institution in sovielthe state is the enterprise in sovielthe state hold the residual claims , and residual controlbecause there are multi - aims of the state and long chain of the principal , but there is not the effective incentive and monitoring in the arranggementdie institution is uneflective . lt is the why the enterprise institution was restructured at the beginning of the new russia 這是對俄羅斯企業(yè)制度“前身”的考察,它的基本特征是:國家就是企業(yè),國家既是剩余索取權(quán)擁有者,又是剩余控制權(quán)擁有者;國家的多目的性、過長的委托鏈、激勵和監(jiān)督的缺乏使這種制度安排沒有效率,改革(制度變遷)因為沒有觸及問題的實質(zhì)而功效甚微,這?切就成了日后俄羅斯重建企業(yè)制度的最根本的原因。第二篇是重建和現(xiàn)狀篇,由五章構(gòu)成。第四章主要討論俄羅斯企業(yè)制度的重建,它是以私有化的形式出現(xiàn)在歷史舞臺上的。