The third part proves that : if the stuff ' s level of effort a is observable , then ( 1 ) , and explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have . the fourth part proves : if the stuff ' s level of effort a is n ' t observable , then explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of non - symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have , gives the reward and punishment measures that the enterprise should take on the employees . the fifth part analyses the influence on the motivation contract form other observable variables such as y , which is irrelevant to the stuff ' s level of effort a by establishing linear contracts s ( m , y ) = a + ( 3 ( m + yy ) , proves if cov ( m , y ) ^ 0 , then we can decrease the agent costs and enhance the accuracy of motivation by putting y into the contract 第一節(jié)通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)典的馬爾可夫轉(zhuǎn)移矩陣的分析,指出了其不具有應(yīng)用的完備性,并對(duì)模型進(jìn)行了改進(jìn);第二節(jié)建立了企業(yè)基于人力資本理論的人才競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略的分析框架;第三節(jié)證明了若員工的努力水平a可觀測(cè),則有( 1 ) , ( 2 ) ,從而說(shuō)明了對(duì)稱信息條件下最優(yōu)合同應(yīng)如何制定以及最優(yōu)合同應(yīng)具備的特征;第四節(jié)證明了若員工的努力水平a不可觀測(cè),則有( 1 ) , ( 2 )從而說(shuō)明了非對(duì)稱信息條件下最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同應(yīng)如何制定以及最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同應(yīng)具備的特征,給出了企業(yè)獎(jiǎng)懲員工的措施;第五節(jié)通過(guò)建立線性合同s ( m , y ) = + ( m + y ) ,分析了與員工努力水平a無(wú)關(guān)的其他可觀測(cè)變量y對(duì)激勵(lì)合同的影響,證明了當(dāng)cov ( m , y ) 0時(shí),將y寫(xiě)入激勵(lì)合同可減少代理成本,也更能提高激勵(lì)的準(zhǔn)確性;第六節(jié)討論人力資本股份化方法,并給出了一種基于人力資本股權(quán)化思想企業(yè)對(duì)利潤(rùn)的分配模型。
百科解釋
In statistics, observable variables or manifest variables, as opposed to latent variables, are those variables that can be observed and directly measured.Dodge, Y.